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PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
KAREN J. MCMULLEN
INTRODUCTION

At common law, grandparents were unable to petition for
court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren.' In response,
state legislators of all fifty states adopted third-party visitation
statutes; many of them were limited to grandparents.2 State
legislatures passed the first wave of grandparent visitation
statutes between 1966 and 1986.' The statutes delineate the
J.D. Candidate, 2009, St. John's University; B.A., 2006, William Smith
College.
1 See Succession of Reiss, 15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894) (stating that parents may
have a moral obligation to allow their parents or in-laws visit their children but do
not have a legal one); Catherine Bostock, Does the Expansion of Grandparent
Visitation Rights Promote the Best Interests of the Child?: A Survey of Grandparent
Visitation Laws in the Fifty States, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 319, 319
(1994) (stating that "common law denied grandparents the legal right to bring
visitation suits"); Kristine L. Roberts, State Supreme Court Applications of Troxel v.
Granville and the Courts' Reluctance To Declare Grandparent Visitation Statutes
Unconstitutional,41 FAM. CT. REV. 14, 15-16 (2003) (noting that before the passage
of the grandparent visitation statutes, grandparents were in the position of all other
non-parents in that they had no right to sue for court-ordered visitation).
2 In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Court noted that "[aIll 50 states
have statutes that provide for grandparent visitation" and listed each statute. Id. at
74 n.*; see also id. at 762 n.26 (listing the statutes); Jeffrey J. Trapani, Comment,
GrandparentVisitation Rights in MassachusettsAfter Troxel: Blixt v. Blixt, 38 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 759, 762 (2004) (stating that in a span of "less than thirty years" the
legislatures of all fifty states passed third-party visitation statutes). The District of
Columbia has never had a grandparent visitation statute.
3 New York passed the first grandparent visitation statute in 1966. See Ch. 631,
1966 N.Y. Laws 766 (McKinney). Nebraska was the last state to pass its first
grandparent visitation statute when it did so in 1986. See Hamit v. Hamit, 715
N.W.2d 512, 525 (Neb. 2006) (citing Judiciary Committee Hearing, 89th Leg., 1st
Sess. 91 (Neb. 1985)).
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circumstances under which grandparents have standing to
4
petition for court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren.
Grandparent
visitation
statutes
were
a
political
phenomenon. Significant demographic changes took place during
the time that the statutes were enacted-large numbers of
seniors and diminishing numbers of traditional nuclear families.5
In the second half of the twentieth century, there was a strong
pro-grandparent social and political sentiment6 and a strong
political force of older Americans.7 Grandparents were "the most
active lobby in the [United States]."8 In fact, commentators have
suggested that because of the increasing number of seniors and
their high level of political involvement, "[vioting against
grandparents is political suicide" for members of state

4 See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text. The state high courts often
interpret the statutes and impose further requirements that are not found in the
plain language of the statutes. See, e.g., Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178,
182, 577 N.E.2d 27, 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 (1991) (stating that a grandparent must
prove a sufficient existing relationship with the grandchild or an effort to establish
one to gain standing although the statute simply states that circumstances must be
such that equity would see fit to intervene). This Note, however, solely addresses the
statutes as written.
, See Natalie Reed, Note, Third-Party Visitation Statutes: Why Are Some
Families More Equal than Others?, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529, 1533-38 (2005) (arguing
that the organization previously known as the American Association of Retired
Persons ("AARP") and the senior lobby used the changing demographics and the
unraveling of the nuclear family structure to invoke "America's deep-rooted fear of
the family's breakdown" and to compel grandparent visitation legislation); see also
Bostock, supra note 1, at 324 ("[Clhanges in family patterns made grandparent
involvement in the nuclear family more attractive in the eyes of Americans and, at
the same time, provoked grandparents to action.").
6 See Bostock, supra note 1, at 322-25.
At a Congressional hearing, Representative Olympia J. Snowe stated that
seventy-five to eighty-five percent of senior citizens are grandparents and that
seniors "are ... retiring earlier, living longer, and are becoming much more
politically active." Id. at 325 (citing GrandparentsRights: Preserving Generational
Bonds, 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Serus. of the H. Select Comm.
on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 103, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter GrandparentsRights
Hearing]) (internal quotation marks omitted). Supporters of grandparent-grandchild
visitation are organized and still advocating their interests. For example, the
mission of nonprofit organization Advocates for Grandparent Grandchild Connection
is to "advocateD for grandchildren" and "support[] grandparents who have suffered
from loss of affection and contact from their grandchildren." Advocates for
Grandparent Grandchild Connection, About Us, http://grandparentchildconnect.org/
about-us/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
" Bostock, supra note 1, at 325 (quoting Grandparents Rights Hearing, supra
note 7, at 2 (statement of Rep. Downey)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In addition, senior groups clearly impacted
legislatures.'
a joint resolution of Congress, with only eight
politics;
national
House members in opposition,1 ° prompted President Clinton to
name 1995 the year of the grandparent. During the 1990s, many
Americans also focused on drug abuse problems of parents,
significant poverty levels, and increasing numbers of out-ofwedlock children.'1 In addition, during this period, Americans
looked less to traditional social institutions, such as churches,
and more toward the legal system as a way to solve their family

problems. 12
What began as a social and political movement, however,
quickly transformed into a constitutional hotbed. Grandparent
visitation statutes implicate the Fourteenth Amendment in two
ways: (1) the substantive due process rights of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children in as much as parents' decisions
are challenged, and (2) the right to equal protection because
many grandparent visitation statutes differentiate among
parents based upon family status. 3 This Note focuses on the
equal protection problem.
This Note argues that statutes that allow grandparents to
petition for visitation with children in specified non-intact
families but do not grant such rights to grandparents seeking
visitation with children in intact nuclear families violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I is
an overview of the current state of grandparent visitation
statutes and gives examples of typical discriminatory statutes.
Part II determines that because the statutory classifications
result in infringement of parents' fundamental right to direct the
' Id. at 325 (quoting ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE
NEW AMERICAN GRANDPARENT 5 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 See id. at 324.
11 See Reed, supra note 5, at 1536-37 (stating that, in California, the AARP
worried that the drug epidemic, poverty, and single parenthood may result in
children being "snatched away by their parents without notice or opportunity for
further contact").
12 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitutionas Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?,
102 COLUM. L. REv. 337, 337, 345-54 (2002) (discussing institutions such as schools,

churches, and communal groups that have changed and withered since World War II
and stating that "Americans have turned to the law.., to define familial
relationships and to help construct new familial forms").
13 The pertinent clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment state that a state shall

not "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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upbringing of their children, the classifications must be strictly
scrutinized.
Part III evaluates the constitutionality of the
statutes. Section A of that Part argues that because all parents
have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of
their children, all parents are similarly situated, and similarly
situated individual parents should not be treated dissimilarly.
The discriminatory statutes, therefore, violate the Equal
Protection Clause on this basis, even before they are strictly
scrutinized. In Section B, the legitimate and compelling state
interests in avoiding harm to children and promoting children's
welfare are identified. Section C examines the classifications to
determine whether they are narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling state interest and concludes that there are two
reasons why the discriminatory statutes are not narrowly
tailored. First, the classification of parents and children based
on family status is not necessary nor is it narrowly tailored to
determine which children need grandparent visitation to promote
their welfare or protect them from harm. Thus, categorization
based on non-intact family status is both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive. Second, classifying parents based on familial
status is not the least restrictive alternative because an
individualized determination of the best interests of the
grandchild will accomplish the state interest while impinging on
parents' fundamental rights only when necessary.
This Note
argues that discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes that
classify parents based on familial status should be held
unconstitutional. That is, the classification is such that single,
nonmarital, or divorced parents wear the invisible "Scarlet 'N'"
to court appearances in which a grandparents visitation rights
are established.
I.

STATUTES MANDATE JUDICIAL DISCRIMINATION

Equal protection concerns arise in the grandparent visitation
context in about half of the states. Such states give grandparents
standing to petition for visitation with grandchildren based on
enumerated non-intact family statuses 14 and enumerate various
14 See infra Appendix for details of which non-intact family statuses are
included in each statute, as well as the nuances of what the grandparent must plead
to gain standing under each statute. There are twenty-six states that base
grandparental standing on the familial status of the grandchild's parent, and, as
some states have more than one pertinent statute, there are a total of thirty-four
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non-intact family situations as the basis for standing: divorce or
separation of the parents, death of one or both parents, or the
non-marriage of the child's parents.1 5 In approximately half of
the states, therefore, grandparents cannot gain standing to
petition for visitation with children in intact nuclear families. 6
In contrast, slightly less than half of the states have either
purely non-discriminatory statutes that apply equally to all
families 7 or hybrid statutes that enumerate one or more familial
statuses as a basis for the grandparents' standing to petition but
also have provisions that permit grandparents to gain standing
to petition for visitation with a child regardless of familial
status.18

such statutes. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-409 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13103(b) (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3104(b) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-117(1)
(2008); FLA. STAT. § 752.01 (2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (2008); 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/607 (2009), invalidated by Felzak v. Hruby, 855 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2006); IND. CODE § 31-17-5-1 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:344 (2008); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 135(B) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D (2008); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 722.27b (2007); MINN. STAT. § 257C.08 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.402
(2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050 (2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:13 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(bl), -13.2A, -13.5(j)
(2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.11-.12, .051 (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 5(c) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(A)(33) (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.433 (Vernon 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-12 (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.09.240 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 48-10-401 (2008); WIS. STAT. §§ 54.56,
767.43(3) (2008).
'" See infra Appendix.
16 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
11 There are a total of fifteen states with statutes that give grandparents equal
standing to petition to visit with children in all families. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 25.20.065 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-719
(2008); IOWA CODE § 600C.1 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 (2007); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 405.021 (West 2009); MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-102 (LexisNexis 2009); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2002); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-4-52 (2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (2009); see also infra Appendix. There
is also proposed legislation in Pennsylvania, which will modify that state's
grandparent visitation statute such that it contains no discriminatory
classifications. See S.B. 515, 190th Gen. Assem., 2007 Sess. (Pa. 2007).
'" There are a total of ten states that either have one statute that contains
discriminatory and non-discriminatory components or multiple statutes that do the
same. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-4.1 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1031 (2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 571-46(a)(7), 46.3 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803 (1998);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3 (2008); N.M. STAT. § 40-9-2 (2009); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 72(1), 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.1 to .3 (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-306 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-5-2 (2008); see also infra
Appendix.
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The Nebraska and Nevada grandparent visitation statutes
are examples of typical discriminatory statutes. Their provisions
enumerate nearly all of the possible non-intact family situations
as bases for grandparental standing and never permit
grandparents to petition for visitation with children living in
nuclear intact families. 9 The Nebraska statute states that a
grandparent "may seek visitation" if one or both of the child's
parents are deceased, if the parents' marriage is dissolved or is in
the process of dissolution, or if the child's parents "have never
been married but paternity has been legally established."20 In
Nebraska, therefore, the decisions of widowed, never-married,
and divorced parents regarding grandparent visitation are
automatically subject to suit upon a grandparent's petition, but
the grandparent visitation decisions of married parents, even if
made under substantially similar circumstances, can never be
challenged in a court proceeding.2 ' Similarly, in Nevada, if a
parent is deceased, grandparents may petition if the parents are
divorced, separated, or if the parents never married but
previously "cohabitated" and are now separated.22 If a child lives
in an intact nuclear family in Nevada, his or her grandparents
have no standing to petition for visitation.
19See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802; NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(1). Many other statutes, such as the Arkansas

20

statute, also apply to familial situations in which parents are divorced or separated,
one parent is deceased, or the child is born out of wedlock. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 913-103(b). Other statutes enumerate fewer non-intact family situations as a basis for
grandparental standing. For instance, the Georgia statute grants standing only if
the parents are divorced or separated but not if a parent is deceased or a child is
born out of wedlock. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (2008). The Wisconsin statutes apply
only to nonmarital families or families in which one parent is deceased but not to
divorced or separated parents. WIS. STAT. §§ 54.56, 767.43(3) (2008). For the
diversity of familial situations included in the discriminatory grandparent visitation
statutes, see Appendix.
21 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(1).
22 See id. §§ 125C.050(1)(a)-(c).
23 See id. § 125C.050(1). Interestingly, from the plain meaning of the statute, it
seems also to be true that grandparents in Nevada cannot gain standing to petition
if the unmarried parents of the child have never lived together, even though this is
also a non-intact family situation in which one parent is absent from the custodial
home. See id. For example, if the parties lived together before and just after the
birth of the child but then moved into separate residences, the parents' decision to
deny or restrict grandparental visitation with the child can be challenged in court.
See id. On the other hand, if the unmarried parents never lived together, not even
briefly, to mutually care for the child, then the parents' decision of whether and to
what extent to grant visitation to grandparents cannot be challenged in court. See
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Part II and Part III evaluate the constitutionality of the
discriminatory statutes that are in place in more than half of the
states. Part II addresses the constitutional rights of parents that
are at stake in grandparent visitation suits and determines
that strict scrutiny applies to equal protection challenges to
grandparent visitation statutes.
Part III argues that the
discriminatory statutes are a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause because they treat similarly situated parents dissimilarly
and they are not narrowly tailored to the compelling state
interest.

II.

STRICT SCRUTINY FOR INFRINGEMENT OF A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

In an equal protection analysis, a classification is subjected
to strict scrutiny in two instances.2 4
First, when the
classification implicates a suspect class, it must be strictly
scrutinized.2 5 Alternatively, strict scrutiny is triggered when the
statute significantly interferes with the exercise of an
individual's fundamental right." The classifications present in
state grandparent visitation statutes, based on marital, living, or
familial status, do not implicate a suspect class. 27 The rights of

' See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (stating that "if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class," the rational basis test
rather than strict scrutiny will be applied). The strict scrutiny test "is of relatively
recent origin;" it was developed in several different constitutional law areas during
the 1960s. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1267, 1270, 1273-75(2007).
25 See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1268-69 (stating that strict scrutiny is utilized
under the Equal Protection Clause when "statutes... discriminate on the basis of
race or other 'suspect' classifications"). For a recent example of a suspect racial
classification that mandated strict judicial scrutiny, see Johnson v. California, 543
U.S. 499, 507-09 (2005).
26 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (stating that because a
classification touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, the Court
must apply strict scrutiny to the equal protection analysis), overruled on other
grounds,Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1975).
27 Race, alienage, and ancestry are suspect classifications. See, e.g., Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1948). Marital or familial status,
however, do not constitute suspect classes, and no court has suggested otherwise. In
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), a zoning ordinance case, the
Court explained family arrangements under a constitutional lew framework. The
Court stated that families have a right of privacy, but instead of applying strict
scrutiny, the Court stated that it "must examine carefully the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
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individual parents, which are at the center of grandparent
visitations suits, are fundamental rights, and thus trigger strict
28

scrutiny.

Rights delineated by the Supreme Court to be explicitly
or impliedly guaranteed by a constitutional provision are
fundamental rights.2 9 The first time the Supreme Court utilized
strict scrutiny in an equal protection case because a statutory
classification constituted a threat to an individual's fundamental
right was in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,3 ° which
involved the forced sterilization of only certain three-time
felons.3 1 Because the right to procreate is "fundamental," and the
statute severely infringed or obliterated this right, the Court
strictly scrutinized the classifications to avoid "invidious...
discrimination" between the classes of three-time felons.3 2 More
than a quarter century after Skinner, in Shapiro v. Thompson,
the Court held that a state law that created a one-year waiting
period before a new resident could collect welfare benefits was a
penalty on the fundamental right to travel, and therefore,
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.3 The Court
explicitly stated that a classification that penalizes the exercise
of a fundamental right is unconstitutional "unless shown to be
challenged regulation," therefore, applying some type of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at
499.
28 See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text. Two state courts utilized strict
scrutiny to evaluate equal protection challenges to grandparent visitation statutes.
One court stated that "a statutory classification is permissible if it furthers a
demonstrably compelling interest of the State and limits its impact as narrowly as
possible consistent with the purpose of the classification." Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d
1052, 1062 (Mass. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, another
court's utilization of strict scrutiny was based on "whether the classification is
necessary to serve the Commonwealth's parens patriae interest and whether the
means used are narrowly tailored to effectuate the state purpose." Schmehl v.
Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 188 (Pa.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 619 (2007). The components
of the strict scrutiny analysis are further examined in this Part and Part III of this
Note.
29 See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000) (stating that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the constitutional basis for the
fundamental nature of parents' rights to make decisions regarding their children).
30 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31 Id. at 536. Under the Oklahoma statute, three-time larcenists were subject to
forced sterilization but three-time embezzlers were not. See id. at 538-39; see also
Fallon, supra note 24, at 1281 (stating that the 'first Supreme Court case to use the
term 'strict scrutiny' in anything like the modem sense was Skinner v. Oklahoma").
32 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
33 Shapiro v. Thomson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969), overruled on other
grounds, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1975).
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necessary to promote a compelling government interest."3 4 Thus,
the Supreme Court's decision in Shapiro created a precedent that
"all classifications bearing on the distribution of fundamental
35
rights trigger strict scrutiny."
Recently, in Troxel v. Granville,3 6 the Supreme Court made a
"rare[] venture[] into the troubled waters of family law" 3v and
deemed a parent's right to the "care, custody, and control" of her
children a fundamental right protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 s The plurality in Troxel
held that the state of Washington's third-party visitation statute
was unconstitutional as applied by the trial court; specifically,
the Court held that the application of the statute violated the
custodial parent's substantive due process rights. 9
The Washington statute did not contain any classifications
that invoked equal protection considerations because it was an
unusually broad statute that allowed virtually every person in
the state to petition to visit with a child. 40 The Washington
statute was "breathtakingly broad."4 1 It allowed "[any person" to
petition for visitation with a child "at any time" and authorized
state courts to order grandparent visitation if it was deemed to
"serve the best interest of the child."42 The Supreme Court's
holding was thus limited to due process grounds because there
was no opportunity to review equal protection considerations in
Troxel.43
Id. at 634.
supra note 24, at 1282. Around the same time that the Supreme Court
decided Shapiro, the Court also decided a voting rights case under the Equal
Protection Clause, Kramer v. Union Free School DistrictNo. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969),
in which the Court used the same strict scrutiny formulation as in Shapiro. See
Fallon, supra note 24, at 1283.
36 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
37 Mary E. O'Connell, The Riddle of Troxel: Is Grandma the State?, 41 FAM. CT.
REV 77, 77 (2003).
34

35 Fallon,

38 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.

9 Id. at 67.
id. at 80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the "uniqueness of the
Washington statute").
41 Id. at 67 (plurality opinion).
42 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2005); see also Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
43 The case was, however, about a doubly non-intact family. Mother Tommie
Granville and father Brad Troxel never married but lived together and had two
daughters. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. When the couple split up, the father moved in
with his own parents. Id. Brad Troxel regularly brought his daughters to their
grandparents' house during his visitation but later committed suicide, leaving the
mother, Tommie Granville as the sole parent. Id. Tommie Granville allowed the
41 See
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In Troxel, however, a plurality of the Supreme Court clearly
stated that this grandparent visitation statute significantly
infringed on the parent's fundamental, constitutionally protected
right." To determine the nature of the parents' interest at stake,
the Troxel plurality cited nine Supreme Court cases, dating from
1923 to 1997, to support its statement that "[t]he liberty interest
at issue[, ... the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children ...is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court."4 5 The
Court stated, "li]nlight of this extensive precedent, it cannot now
be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their
46
children.
The Supreme Court clearly determined that the right of
parents to make decisions about grandparent visitation is part of
this fundamental
right protected
by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.4 ' Furthermore, the Court
explained that grandparent visitation statutes significantly
infringe on this parental right because they allow courts to decide
whether to grant grandparents
visitation with their
Troxels limited visitation, but they sought and petitioned for more. Id. at 60-61.
Although the Court did not focus on the non-intact family status of Granville and
her daughters, the plurality opinion did briefly note that "this case involves a
visitation petition filed by grandparents soon after the death of their son." Id. at 68.
The plurality resolved this brief interlude into the outer edges of equal protection by
reiterating the due process holding; the court stated, "the combination of several
factors here compels our conclusion that [the Washington State third-party
visitation statute] as applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause." Id.
Thus, the Court focused on due process and did not address equal protection. See id.
4Id.

45 Id.

at 60.

at 65. The Supreme Court plurality quoted and cited Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925),
for the proposition that parents have a right to "direct" and "control" their children.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. The plurality further quoted Prince v.Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944), stating, "[iut is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents. . . ." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (internal
quotations omitted). The Court then stated, "[iun subsequent cases also, we have
recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of their children." Id. at 66 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979); Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720
(1997)).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
47 Id.

at 66-67.
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grandchildren, thus supplanting the parent's decision-making
ability.4" Specifically, because of the fundamental nature of the
parent's right, a presumption in favor of a fit parent's decision to
deny or limit visitation with grandparents is required. 49 "[T]he
Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the
fundamental right of parents to make childrearing decisions
simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be
made." 50
Therefore, the Troxel decision leaves room for the conclusion
that strict scrutiny applies in an equal protection challenge to a
grandparent visitation statute. The plurality opinion did not
directly state the level of scrutiny applicable to grandparent
visitation cases5 1 but did clearly state that a parent's right to the
care, custody, and control of his or her children is "fundamental"
and that the statute infringed that right.5 2 Because significant
infringements of fundamental rights trigger strict scrutiny, strict
scrutiny is the proper standard to evaluate classifications within
grandparent visitation statutes.
In addition, two state cases that addressed equal protection
challenges after Troxel strictly scrutinized discriminatory
grandparent visitation statutes. 3 In the first case, Blixt v. Blixt,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts used Troxel to
determine that a fundamental right was at stake, 4 and the court
stated that "ib]ecause the statute's classifications implicate
fundamental
parental
rights, 'strict
scrutiny' analysis
is... appropriate."5 5 Similarly, in Schmehl v. Wegelin, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that because the
classification "authoriz[ed] an infringement on a parent's
fundamental right to make child-rearing decisions," the court
must apply strict scrutiny. 56 Likewise, most post-Troxel state
Id. at 68-73.
4 See id. at 69-70.
50 Id. at 72-73.

51 Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, stated that the plurality did not
"articulate[] the appropriate standard of review" and that he would "apply strict
scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights," such as the infringement by
grandparent visitation statutes on parents' rights. Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
5' Id. at 66-67 (plurality opinion).
Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (Mass. 2002); Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d
183 (Pa.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 619 (2007).

774 N.E.2d at 1059.

Id. at 1062.
927 A.2d at 188 (citing Smith v. Coyne, 722 A.2d 1022, 1025 (Pa. 1999)).
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court decisions utilize strict scrutiny to evaluate due process
challenges to grandparent visitation statutes, 7 with limited
exceptions.58 Abundant precedent, therefore, compels the use of
strict scrutiny to analyze an equal protection challenge to
discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes.
III. DISCRIMINATORY STATUTES VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE

This Part evaluates the constitutionality of discriminatory
grandparent visitation statutes. To survive an equal protection
challenge, the statutes must classify differently situated
individuals and satisfy strict scrutiny.
Section A argues
that the statutes are unconstitutional because they treat
similarly situated people differently to the disadvantage of
non-intact family parents. Accordingly, Sections B and C subject
discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes to strict scrutiny;
to satsify strict scrutiny there must be a compelling state interest
and a demonstration that the classification based on family
status is narrowly tailored to promote that compelling state
interest.
A.

Parentsof Intact and Non-Intact FamiliesAre Similarly
Situated
Although
grandparent
visitation
statutes
promote
compelling state interests, the discriminatory statutes are
unconstitutional if, as a threshold determination, they treat
similarly situated persons differently.
All fit parents are

51 See, e.g., Lamberts v. Lillig, 670 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Iowa 2003) (utilizing strict
scrutiny to invalidate the grandparent visitation statute that permits grandparents
to petition when a grandparent's child-the parent of the grandchild-has died);
Koshko v. Haining, 921 A.2d 171, 187 (Md. 2007) (applying strict scrutiny to a due
process analysis of the Maryland grandparent visitation statute due to direct and
substantial interference with a fundamental right); Oliver v. Feldner, 776 N.E.2d
499, 505 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (applying strict scrutiny due to infringement of a
fundamental right and stating that a law rarely survives strict scrutiny); In re Appel
v. Appel, 109 P.3d 405, 410 (Wash. 2005) (stating that state interference with a
parent's liberty interest must be subjected to strict scrutiny).
58 See, e.g., Seagrave v. Price, 79 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Ark. 2002) (applying the
rational basis test to an equal protection challenge to an Arkansas grandparent
visitation statute); Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537, 546 (Mo. 2002) (stating that
invalidating the statute under a due process analysis using strict scrutiny was not
necessary and leaving the determination of the validity of a particular statute to a
case-by-case analysis).
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similarly situated. A court must give the same weight to a
custodial parent's decision regarding grandparent visitation
whether that parent is married, divorced, separated, or a single
parent.5 9 In Troxel, the Supreme Court stated that the children's
mother, who had never married and was separated from the
children's subsequently deceased father, was presumptively a fit
parent and must be treated as such.60 The Supreme Court
further stated that in evaluating a grandparent visitation case,
the trial court must presume that a fit parent acts in the best
interests of her children, must place the burden of rebutting the
presumption on the grandparent, and must accord "material" or
"significant weight" to the parent's decision.6 ' These standards
apply to custodial parents of intact and non-intact families
alike.6 2 Thus, the legal status of all fit parents is the same, and
an identical amount of respect should be accorded to the
parenting decisions of married, separated, single, and widowed
parents, regardless of whether the parent is living with the
child's other parent.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court established a
rubric to determine when two groups of people with different
marital statuses are actually similarly situated.6 3 In Eisenstadt,
the Court addressed a Massachusetts statute that permitted
married people to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy but
denied contraceptives to unmarried people who wished to use
"[Tihe right of the individual,
them for the same purpose.'
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child" was at the heart of the
-9 An unfit parent is an "unsuitable and neglectful" parent who is not suited to
have custody of his or her children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972). A fit
parent "adequately cares for his or her children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68
(2000). A parent's fitness may be questioned in child abuse and child neglect
petitions in each state.
I Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
61Id. at 68-70, 72.

62 See id. at 68 (stating that the court must presume a fit parent acts in her
child's best interests and that as long as a parent is fit, there is normally no reason
for the state to question the parent's child-rearing decisions).
405 U.S. 438, 450-53 (1972).
Id. at 441-42. The Court identified "three distinct classes of distributees":
(1) married persons who can obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy with a
prescription, (2) single persons who may not obtain contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy, and (3) all people who may obtain contraceptives to prevent the spread of
disease. Id. at 442.
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right of privacy at issue in the case.65 Similarly, the right of each
fit parent to freely make decisions regarding the care, custody,
and control of her children is the fundamental right at issue in
grandparent visitation cases.66 Just as each individual married
or unmarried person in Eisenstadthad an identical constitutional
right to decide whether to have children despite differing marital
statuses, each individual parent, whether the head of an intact or
non-intact family, has the same constitutional right to make
decisions in the best interests of his or her children. Thus, from
a constitutional perspective, all fit custodial parents are similarly
situated.
The Equal Protection Clause generally mandates that
similarly situated individuals be treated alike.
In Eisenstadt,
the Court held that the contraceptive statute did not even pass
the fairly deferential rational basis test 6 because "dissimilar
treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly
situated" was a clear violation of equal protection.69 In essence,
one standard for married people and a different standard for
similarly situated single people denied equal protection of the
law to unmarried people.7 ° Likewise, discriminatory grandparent
visitation statutes violate equal protection because they treat
similarly situated parents differently. The decisions of parents of
Id. at 453.
' Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72.
67 See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (stating that
under the Fourteenth Amendment "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike").
68 The Court did not determine the level of scrutiny that should apply but simply
applied the less stringent rational basis test. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 447. The Court
noted that if the statute impinged on the fundamental freedoms outlined in
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which involved the right of two
married people to use contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, then strict scrutiny
would have to be utilized. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447 n.7. The Court decided,
however, that the law did not satisfy the "more lenient equal protection standard,"
and therefore, the level of scrutiny need not be determined. Id. There were three
reasons why the Court found that the different treatment accorded married and
unmarried persons by the statute could not be rationally explained. First, "[iut would
be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed [unwanted]
pregnancy... as punishment" for the misdemeanor of fornication. Id. at 448.
Second, there was no health reason to allow married people to use contraceptives but
deny the products to unmarried people. Id. at 450. Third, a simple prohibition on
contraception did not apply because married persons had the right to use
contraceptives. Id. at 452-53.
69 Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 454-55.
70 Id.
65
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non-intact families are called into question by the court when a
grandparent petitions for visitation, whereas grandparents are
prohibited from petitioning to question the similar decisions of
nuclear family parents.7 '
This distinction based on familial status is arbitrary and
constitutionally unsatisfactory. For instance, divorce does not
diminish a parent's fundamental right to make decisions about
his or her child, and therefore, there is no "real and genuine
distinction" between divorced and married parents upon which to
permit state interference in the form of grandparent visitation
suits.7 2 To uphold the classification of parents based on marital
or familial status suggests that divorced parents are less fit than
married parents.7 3 This is clearly unconstitutional under Troxel,
in which the Court accorded the same presumptions and weight
to a fit parent's child-rearing decisions regardless of familial
status.74
As shown by state court analyses of nondiscriminatory
grandparent visitation statutes that do not base standing on
familial status, state courts have noted that all fit parents must
be treated equally. In one pre-Troxel case, a family court in New
York explained that intact families and single parents are subject
to an equal amount of state interference under the statute
because to treat divorced or out-of-wedlock parents differently
would be to inappropriately suggest that parents of non-intact
families are less fit. 75
The New York Court of Appeals
subsequently confirmed that intact and non-intact families are
equally subject to grandparent visitation petitions. 6
71 See supra notes 14-16, 19-23 and accompanying text.
72 Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 195 (Pa.) (Baldwin, J., dissenting), cert.

denied, 128 S. Ct. 619 (2007).
71 See id. at 192-93 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the classification in

the Pennsylvania statute did not separate children at risk but rather suggested
"that divorced or separated parents are inherently less fit to parent, as compared to
parents who have married, or to parents who have never married, but who
conjugate").
7" Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68 (2000).
" Frances E. v. Peter E., 125 Misc. 2d 164, 167, 479 N.Y.S.2d 319, 322 (Family
Ct. Nassau County 1984); see also Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 511, 515-16
(Fla. 1998) (holding that Florida Statute § 725.001(1)(a) (1993), which granted
grandparents standing to petition on the death of a parent, was unconstitutional).
76 See Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 179-82, 577 N.E.2d 27, 28-30,
573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37-39 (1991). The New York Court of Appeals explicitly refused to
address constitutional issues in this case. Id. at 183, 577 N.E.2d at 30, 573 N.Y.S.2d
at 39.
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The Supreme Court of Iowa, addressing the rights of a
divorced parent after the Supreme Court decided Troxel, stated
that there is a presumption that a fit parent acts in the best
interests of his or her children and "[tihis presumption is not
simply applicable to joint decisions of fit married parents, but
applies to the decisions of all fit parents."7 7 "Divorce does not
diminish the parent's fundamental interest in parenting and does
not make them less capable parents," and therefore, divorced
parents are presumed to be as fit as married parents and their
decisions are given the same respect.7 8 Likewise, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine noted that "parental death standing
alone" was not an "urgent reason," as required by Maine, to
justify "a court's interference" with the family. 9 The Maine court
stated that because the death of a parent does not affect "the
surviving parent's fundamental right" to decide whether a
grandparent should have visitation, it cannot be the sole basis on
which a grandparent is granted standing to petition." Therefore,
based on the precedent in Eisenstadt and state case law, all fit
parents are similarly situated, and to discriminate between
parents based on familial status is a violation of equal protection.
Therefore, even before strict scrutiny is applied,
discriminatory
grandparent
visitation
statutes
are
unconstitutional because they impermissibly discriminate
against one subset of similarly situated parents. The next two
Sections, however, argue that even if parents in non-intact and
nuclear families are differently situated, the discriminatory
grandparent visitation statutes do not satisfy strict scrutiny.
B.

The Legitimate and Compelling State Interest

The first step of the strict scrutiny equal protection analysis
is to determine the state's legitimate and compelling interest in
grandparent visitation statutes.8 1 States claim that the same
compelling interest that justifies classifying parents based on
77 In re Marriage of Howard, 661 N.W.2d 183, 192 (Iowa 2003). This case was
based on a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process challenge. Id. at 187.
78 Id. at 192.
79 Conlogue

v. Conlogue, 890 A.2d 691, 698 (Me. 2006).
Although the rationale of the Maine court was based on substantive due
process grounds, the court correctly granted equal respect to decisions of all fit
parents. Id. at 699.
81 See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1321 ("Application of strict scrutiny obviously
requires the identification of compelling governmental interests.").
80 Id.
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family status justifies visitation statutes on the whole because
the classification is meant to "narrow" the statute's application to
the children who most need grandparent visitation. 2 Thus, state
courts have put forth one of two compelling interests:
(1) avoidance of harm to the child, or (2) promotion of the child's
health, safety, and welfare. Many legal scholars and state courts
favor the harm standard. 3
The Supreme Court in Troxel,
refused to require that grandparents show that their absence
would harm the child. 4 Arguably, therefore, the Constitution
does not recognize the avoidance of harm as the only state

82 See Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 187 (Pa.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 619
(2007) (referencing the "classification scheme restricting [the statute's] reach to a
limited class of grandparents" as at the heart of narrow tailoring).
"I The New Jersey Superior Court stated the argument for the harm standard
most clearly when it wrote that "the only state interest warranting the invocation of
the State's parens patriae jurisdiction to overcome the presumption in favor of a
parent's decision... is the avoidance of harm to the child." Daniels v. Daniels, 885
A.2d 524, 526 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). Many other courts utilize similar
approaches. See, e.g., Glidden v. Conley, 820 A.2d 197, 205 (Vt. 2003) (stating that a
grandparent may rebut the presumption in favor of a fit parent by offering "evidence
of compelling circumstances" such as "parental unfitness" or that "significant harm
to the child will result in the absence of a visitation order"); In re Appel v. Appel, 109
P.3d 405, 410 (Wash. 2005) (stating that the grandparent must show that a denial of
visitation would result in harm to the child). In addition, recent scholarship has
argued for the harm standard. See, e.g., Stephen A. Newman, Grandparent
Visitation Claims: Assessing the Multiple Harms of Litigation to Families and
Children, 13 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 21, 23 (2003) (arguing that a grandparent should
have to prove clear harm to the child to justify court-ordered visitation); Andres
Mayor, Note, Protecting Parents' Fundamental Rights and Children Under New
Jersey's Grandparent Visitation Statute: The Need To Establish Harm to the
Grandchild by Clear and Convincing Evidence, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 276 (2005)
(arguing that a state statute should require "clear and convincing evidence that the
denial of visitation to the child will cause significant and demonstrable physical or
psychological harm to the child"); cf Elliott Scheinberg, Grandparental Visitation:
Its Evolution in New York State, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY & ETHICS J. 289, 290-91
(2004) (arguing for a standard that necessitates evidence of a prior grandparentgrandchildren relationship). But see Susan Tomaine, Comment, Troxel v. Granville:
Protecting Fundamental Parental Rights While Recognizing Changes in the
American Family, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 777 (2001) (noting that Justice Stevens's
and Justice Kennedy's dissents rejected the harm standard and that Justice Scalia
argued that such a decision is for the states). Pre-Troxel cases also utilized the harm
standard. See, e.g., Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1995); In re Herbst
v. Sayre, 971 P.2d 395, 398-99 (Okla. 1998).
' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000). The plurality stated that it did not
consider "whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation
statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a condition
precedent to granting visitation." Id.
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interest compelling enough for strict scrutiny, and states are free
to evaluate the constitutionality of their visitation statutes on
either ground.
In addition, the difference between the harm standard and
the welfare standard is simply one of degree. The two state court
cases that addressed equal protection challenges to grandparent
visitation statutes, Blixt v. Blixt and Schmehl v. Wegelin,
illustrate this point. In Blixt, the court "interpreted" the statute
"to require a showing of harm" and found that the statute
furthered "a compelling and legitimate State interest in
mitigating potential harm to children in non-intact families.""5
On the other hand, in Schmehl, the court stated that the
"compelling state interest" was the protection of "the health
and emotional welfare of children."8 6
The Schmehl court,
nevertheless, dipped into the harm standard while analyzing
equal protection; it recognized "the heightened risk of harm
arising from the breakdown of a marriage" when it determined
that the statute was "directed toward promoting the welfare of
the child.""
Certainly, promotion of the welfare of a child
includes the avoidance of harm. Thus, the harm standard is a
more stringent and narrowly defined companion to the welfare
standard.
Overall, the distinction between the two standards is simply
one of degree and is not significant in evaluating the
constitutionality of discriminatory statutes. This Note argues
that state grandparent visitation statutes that contain
classifications based on familial status violate the Equal
s5Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2002).
'6Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 186-87 (citing Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa.
2006)) (substantive due process case that focused on grandparent visitation). In
Hiller v. Fausey, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that "requiring
grandparents to demonstrate that the denial of visitation would result in
harm ... would set the bar too high," 904 Ad.2d at 890 and noted that some courts
have rejected the harm standard. Id. at 889 n.22.
87 Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 187, 189-90. Of course, there are also other ways to
promote the welfare of a child. Other courts have focused on promoting the
relationship between the grandparent and the grandchild. See, e.g., Hamit v. Hamit,
715 N.W.2d 512, 527-28 (Neb. 2006) (noting the requirements of the Nebraska
statute and stating that the grandparent must prove a significant, beneficial,
existing relationship with a child but not providing the specific compelling state
interest of the statute); In re Pensom, 126 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tex. App. 2003)
(mentioning the "child's well-being" and stating that the "State has a compelling
interest in providing a forum for those grandparents having a significant existing
relationship with their grandchildren").
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Protection Clause because they are not narrowly tailored or
necessary to promote either state interest. Where applicable,
however, this Note references the harm standard because it is
more prevalent in state court decisions and is the focus of many
legal commentators.8
C.

The Requirement That the ClassificationIs Narrowly
Tailored To Achieve the Compelling State Interest

This Section argues that there are two reasons why
discriminatory statutes are not narrowly tailored to avoid harm
to the child and/or promote the welfare of the child. First, the
classification based on family status is an inadequate proxy for
determining which children are harmed by the absence of
grandparent visitation, and, as a result, the classification is both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Secondly, the classification
based on familial status is not the least restrictive alternative.
An individualized determination of the child's need for
grandparent visitation would impinge on a parent's fundamental
right only when necessary for the child's sake, rather than
broadly grouping together all non-intact parents and children
and subjecting all of their families to grandparent visitation
suits. It is, therefore, a less restrictive alternative.
1.

Non-Intact Family Status Is an Inadequate Proxy for Harm
The first reason the classification is not narrowly tailored to
the compelling state interest is because familial status is not a
proxy for determining which children are the most likely to be
harmed by the absence of their grandparents. To use familial
status as a proxy assumes that children of non-intact families are
at a much greater risk of harm due to the absence of grandparent
visitation than children of intact nuclear families. This is a
dangerous assumption that has no basis in law or fact.
Two state courts have addressed the use of classifications
based on family status as a proxy. Each court held that the
classifications were satisfactory proxies, but the courts' analyses
used generalized statements and contained no empirical data. In
Blixt v. Blixt, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that a statute that did "not apply to grandparents of a minor
child whose parents are living together" did not violate the Equal
' See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Protection Clause.8 9 The court reasoned that the "burden of the
traumatic loss of a grandparent's significant presence may fall
most heavily on the child whose unmarried parents live apart."9"
The court asserted that this is because "a nonmarital child born
out of wedlock, living apart from the child's other parent" does
not have two parents to help "in coping" with the absence
of the grandparent. 91
The court further stated that the
legislature could conclude, from "social experience," that there
was a "heightened risk" to children in non-intact families and
reiterated that these children "may be especially vulnerable to
real harm from the loss or absence of a grandparent's significant
presence."92 The Massachusetts court did not elaborate on the
"social experience" component of its analysis or give any
supporting empirical data or examples.9 3
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Schmehl v. Wegelin,
held that its grandparent visitation statute, which granted
grandparents standing to petition when the child's parents were
divorced, divorcing, or separated for at least six months, did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 9a The court referenced
a previous decision and found the classification of parents
89 Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1062 (Mass. 2002). In addressing the equal
protection challenge, the court went out of its way to state that its review of the
statute applied only to the mother's specific class-the "parent of a nonmarital child
born out of wedlock, living apart from the child's other parent." Id. The court stated
that divorced, married, and widowed parents raise different characteristics and
issues such that only persons of those classifications can challenge them. Id. at 1063.
Dissenting Justice Sosman disagreed with this approach and stated that "[ijt is the
parent's decision to live apart, not any other characteristic" that grants the
grandparent standing to petition. Id. at 1076 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 1065 (majority opinion).
91 Id. at 1062, 1065.
Id. at 1064.

93Id.
I Schmehl v. Wegelin, 927 A.2d 183, 184, 190 (Pa.), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 619
(2007). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned the trial court, which held that
the statute impermissibly treated intact families differently from divorced or
separated parents. Id. at 185, 190. The trial court's rationale was that the statute's
classifications burdened each parent's fundamental right to make decisions about
the upbringing of his or her children, which was not "necessary to vindicate a
compelling government interest;" therefore, the classification did not survive strict
scrutiny. Id. at 185. In overturning the trial court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
referenced its own due process decision less than a year earlier, in Hiller v. Fausey,
904 A.2d 875, 886 (Pa. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1876 (2007), and stated that the
classification of parents "was at the heart of the determination that the statute was
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest" of protecting the welfare of
children. Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 187.
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permissible because the "classification scheme restrict[s] its
reach to a limited class of grandparents."9" The Schmehl court
noted the rather conclusory "public policy" included in the
statute, which was to assure "the continuing contact of the
child... with grandparents when the parent is deceased,
divorced or separated."9"
The court then recognized the
"heightened risk of harm arising from the breakdown of a
marriage" but did not state how this harm was related to a
child's need to visit with a grandparent. 97 Without further
explanation or "proffering any independent analysis as to how
classifying parents by marital status is necessary to protect the
compelling interest of the state,"9 the court held that the statute
did not violate equal protection because "the classification ... is
directly and narrowly tailored to such breakdown" of the parent's
marriage.99 The court did not describe how or why the welfare of
a child of divorced parents would be negatively affected without
court-ordered grandparent visitation. 100
Both cases were followed by strong and lengthy dissents. In
his dissent in Schmhel, Justice Cappy argued that strict scrutiny
is not satisfied by grouping parents based on marital status
Such classification does not protect the best interests of the child

"' Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 186-87 (citing Hiller, 904 A.2d at 886). The court's
decision in Schmehl was arguably dependent on its previous decision in Hiller. In
Hiller, the court referenced a different grandparent visitation statute of the state
and a different type of non-intact family and stated that the statute "narrowly limits
those who can seek visitation or partial custody ... to grandparents whose child has
died." 904 A.2d at 886. Thus, as Schmehl addressed a divorced parent and Hiller
addressed a widowed parent, Hiller was not on point and therefore, the court's
holding in Hiller was distinguishable. See Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 193 (Cappy, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 195 (Baldwin, J., dissenting) (stating that Hiller did not apply
"beyond the exceedingly narrow circumstance where a parent has died and the
grandparent had a significant relationship with the child").
I Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 187 (quoting 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5301 (2009)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Schmehl court also posited the idea that "substantive
due process and equal protection inquiries are essentially identical" in regard to
determining the applicable level of scrutiny and whether the infringement on
parents' rights is acceptable. Id. One of the dissents took exception to this statement,
stating that the analyses differ in that due process asks if there is an acceptable
infringement, whereas equal protection "considers whether the government's
interest is sufficient to support a particular classification." Id. at 191 (Cappy, C.J.,
dissenting).
9' Id. at 189 (majority opinion).
Id. at 192 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 189 (majority opinion).
100 See id.
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because "divorce or separation alone is not a proxy for
determining which parents might cause their children harm."' ° '
In his dissent in Schmhel, Justice Baldwin argued that all fit
parents are similarly situated and that the classification of
parents was not based on a "real and genuine distinction." 10 2 In
his dissenting opinion in Blixt, Justice Sosman argued that the
court resorted to "vague generalizations verging on pure
stereotypes of families that are not 'intact.'"103 Sosman stated
that the classifications of parents did not identify the children
most likely to be harmed by a lack of grandparent visitation
because classifications based on living status do "not identify
a category of at-risk children with anything approaching
the requisite degree of precision. " 1°4 He then argued that a
classification based on non-intact family status could not be
10 5
narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest.
These holdings are incorrect because familial status is not a
proxy for determining whether and to what extent children are
harmed due to the absence of a grandparent's presence. The
court's holding in Schmehl was conclusory and lacked substance,
and the court's holding in Blixt was vague and based on a wide
range of unsubstantiated assumptions about the vulnerability
of children of non-intact families.
Likewise, the statutory
classifications approved by these state courts are over-inclusive
because they permit grandparents to petition for visitation with
every grandchild that lives in a non-intact family, whether or not
that child is in need of the grandparent's presence. Neither state
court gave an adequate explanation of why or how children in
non-intact families, due specifically to their familial status, are
'01 Id. at 192 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 195 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
103 Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1079 (Mass. 2002) (Sosman, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1076.
105 Id. at 1077-81. The dissenting opinion analyzes the application of the statute
to divorced parents, married parents who are not living together, instances of the
death of one parent, and instances in which children are born out of wedlock and the
parents do not live together. Id. at 1077-79. Justice Sosman's arguments often focus
on the fact that many parents from non-intact families are the head of stable
families and that often one parent remarries or cohabits with another adult who is
not the other biological parent but is instead a de facto parent for the child. Id. at
1077-80. The dissenting justice further points out that the court does not consider
the following groups: stepparent families, families with adopted children, stable
single-parent families, or gay and lesbian couples. As the dissenting justice states,all
of these families may have safe and stable homes in which children are not subject
to harm due to the absence of grandparent visitation. Id. at 1078-79.
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automatically at great risk of harm due to lack of grandparent
visitation. °6 Therefore, the classification of parents based on
non-intact family status rests on "arbitrary" and overbroad
distinctions that are not a "substitute" for making an
individualized determination as to whether a child, in any type
of family, may be harmed in the absence of court-ordered
grandparent visitation. 10 7
An opinion of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma sheds light on
the reasoning behind discriminatory grandparent visitation
statutes and courts' willingness to uphold them. In Graham v.
Woffard, the court made clear that it believed that children in
nuclear families are insulated from any harm that may be caused
by lack of grandparent visitation simply by virtue of their intact
family status. 0 8
The court stated that "unless something
in the nuclear home harms or threatens to harm the child, the
State may not interfere." 10 9 The Oklahoma court opined that if
the harm to a child of an intact family is "great enough for
State intervention" in an intact nuclear family, an abuse or
neglect case against the parents would be warranted. 110 This
case illustrates the rationale that underlies discriminatory
grandparent visitation statutes-the belief that nuclear families
are all but indestructible and that the decisions of parents of
intact families should never be questioned unless their acts rise
to a level of harm that is so damaging to the child's health and
welfare that it cannot be ignored by the state. This position
results in over-inclusive visitation statutes that are designed to
protect the autonomy of the intact nuclear family instead of being
designed to protect and promote the welfare of each individual
child. Thus, the discriminatory statutes fail to find and protect
all of the children who are genuinely in need of grandparent
visitation.
The classification of parents based on familial status is also
under-inclusive because it rests on a conclusory determination
that no child in an intact nuclear family can be in need of court106
107

See generally Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052; Schmehl, 927 A.2d 183.
See Schmehl, 927 A.2d at 193 (Cappy, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the

"distinction between parents based on marital or quasi-marital status is arbitrary"
and that "separating the married or cohabiting from the divorced or separated is not
a substitute for determining which parents might cause their children harm").
10" 2000 OK Civ. App. 101,
8, 12 P.3d 487, 489.
109Id. at 6, 12 P.3d at 488 (emphasis added).
110 Id. at 6, 12 P.3d at 488-89.
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ordered grandparent visitation.
Living with one's parents,
however, "does not serve to insulate a child from trauma, loss, or
genuine disruption.""'
Situations in which nuclear family
parents harm the child by denying contact with grandparents
can be contemplated. For instance, nuclear family parents may
cut off the grandparent-grandchild relationship in bad faith to
derive
a
benefit
from
the
grandparents
or
due
to a petty grandparent-parent argument that does not involve
the grandchild. In addition, Justice Sosman's dissent argued
that domestic violence within intact nuclear families may
create a situation where the child is in need of grandparent
visitation." 2 Situations in which one or both parents of a nuclear
family suffer from substance abuse or a serious mental illness,
medical disease, or disability may cause the child to rely on a
grandparent for support and stability.'1 3 In short, the simple fact
that a child's parents are married and live together in the same
household does not mean that the child is insulated from harm
that could be avoided if grandparent visitation petitions were
permitted.
2.

A Less Restrictive Alternative Based upon Individual
Determination Is Available

The last step in determining whether a statutory
classification is narrowly tailored to the compelling state interest
is to decide whether the classification is the least restrictive
alternative.1 4 A classification that impinges on the parents'
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their
children when a less restrictive alternative is viable violates the
parents' equal protection right embodied in the Fourteenth
1 5
Amendment.

Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1083 (Sosman, J., dissenting).
Id.
113 Id.
114 See Fallon, supra note 24, at 1326 (stating that when there is infringement of
a protected right, "the government's chosen means must be the least restrictive
alternative that would achieve its goals" and that "[a] law would not be necessary to
achieve its ends if the government could accomplish the same result while inflicting
lesser burdens on protected rights") (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973) (stating
that if "state action impinges on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or
liberties," the state must "be found to have chosen the least restrictive alternative"
to satisfy strict scrutiny of the statute).
I"
112
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A statutory standing provision that mandates an
individualized determination of whether a child is in need of
grandparent visitation is a viable alternative that places fewer
burdens on the parent's fundamental right to direct the
upbringing of his or her children. Instead of using familial
status-a grossly inaccurate proxy for determining harm to
children-grandparents would gain standing only when they
can show that the particular child is likely to be in substantial
need of court-ordered visitation. One prevalent example of an
individualized determination grants a grandparent standing
to petition for visitation with his or her grandchild only if
the grandparent pleads that there is a significant existing
grandparent-grandchild relationship that has been severed by
the parent.
In fact, there is a significant movement toward
implementing a standard that mandates that the petitioning
grandparent plead and prove a significant and existing
grandparent-grandchild relationship. Nearly a third of all states
have codified the relationship standard for pleadings,11 6 and
other state courts have interpreted their statutes to include
such a requirement, even if it is not codified.' 1 7 Indeed, the
116 Fifteen state statutes, discriminatory and nondiscriminatory alike, require
the grandparent to plead or prove a relationship with the grandchild. Eight
discriminatory statutes require that the grandparents' petition state that the child
resided with, was supported by, or had a significant existing relationship with the
grandparents for a certain time period before the petition was filed. See MICH.

COMP. LAWS § 722.27b (2007); MINN. STAT. § 257C.08(3) (2008); MO. REV. STAT.
§ 452.402(1) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125C.050(1) (2009); N.M. STAT. §§ 40-9-2(C)-

(D) (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5(A)(1)(c) (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240
(2005); WIS. STAT. § 767.43(3) (2008). In addition, three of the ten purely
nondiscriminatory state statutes demand grandparent-grandchild contact or a
significant personal relationship for the grandparent to gain standing. See ALASKA
STAT. § 25.20.065(a) (2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129(a) (2007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 109.119(1) (2007). Lastly, there are four hybrid statutes that contain a significant
relationship requirement. See ME. REV. STAT ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1803(1) (2009); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 93-16-3(2)-(3) (2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5313(a) (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-306(a) (2009). See Appendix for the specific requirements of the
relationship standard of each statute, as well as other statutes with relationship
requirements interposed after standing is established.
117 See, e.g., Blixt, 774 N.E.2d at 1060-61 (reading a requirement of harm to the
child in the absence of grandparent visitation into the statute to render it
constitutional); Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 78 N.Y.2d 178, 182-83, 577 N.E.2d 27, 30,
573 N.Y.S.2d 36, 39 (1991) (holding that the equity-based statute requires that the
grandparent seeking standing must prove a sufficient existing relationship with the
grandchild or an effort to establish one).
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child's past relationship with the grandparent and the beneficial
nature of that relationship are arguably the best bases for
understanding whether a child is in need of grandparent
visitation and certainly is preferable to categorizing families
based on marital status. 118 For instance, if the child lived with
and had a parent-like relationship with his or her grandparents
for an extended period of time, it is irrelevant whether the
child's parents are married. But it is clearly important that
the child has an emotional need to continue the well-established
and healthy grandparent-grandchild relationship. 1 9
The
grandparent-grandchild relationship standard, however, is one
individualized pleading standard among others that may be
considered by state legislatures. 2 0
There are two reasons why an individualized pleading
standard is a less restrictive alternative. First, the Supreme
Court has held that when a fundamental right is at stake, it 121
is
more likely that individualized determinations are necessary.
Second, the statutory assumption that children in non-intact
families are more in need of court-ordered grandparent visitation
is weak and does not produce consistent and predictable results;
thus, an individualized determination is necessary to make the
statute constitutional. 2 2

118 See, e.g., Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for Nonparents After Troxel v.
Granville: Where Should States Draw the Line?, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 783, 791-98 (2001)
(arguing that, to gain standing, the petitioning non-parent should have to prove he
has played a role in the child's life); Scheinberg, supra note 83, at 290-91 (arguing
that New York's standard should continue to d evidence of a prior grandparentgrandchild relationship); Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v.
Granville and the ConstitutionalRights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 225, 231 (2001) (arguing that only psychosocial parents of children should be
permitted to gain standing to petition for visitation); see also supra note 115 and
accompanying text.
119 See Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291, 301-02 (Me. 2000) (stating that when
grandparents act as parents for their grandchild, the child has a "significant need"
for continued contact with the grandparents that justifies state intervention).
120 If an individualized pleading standard is essential to the constitutionality of
grandparent visitation statutes, some nondiscriminatory state statutes would also
be held unconstitutional for failure to utilize the least restrictive alternative. It is
likely that this would be a rare instance, because most state courts have read their
broadly worded nondiscriminatory statutes to necessitate individualized pleading.
See supra note 117 and accompanying text. That discussion, however, is outside the
scope of this Note.
121 See infra text accompanying notes 123-132 and accompanying text.
122 See infra notes 133-139 and accompanying text.
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When a fundamental right is at stake, there is a much
stronger likelihood that a case-by-case determination is
necessary.
The opinions in Califano v. Jobst123-an equal
protection case applying the rational basis test-and Stanley v.
Illinois124-a procedural due process and equal protection caseprovide examples. In Califano, a disabled child challenged a
Social Security Act provision that terminated his insurance
benefits when he married a woman who was not entitled to
benefits under the Act.1 25
The Court held that Congress's
decision not to require "individualized proof on a case-by-case
basis" was rational, and the use of age and marital status to
determine dependency on parents was justified. 2 6 In contrast, in
Stanley, the Court held that individualized proof was necessary
to determine whether an unwed father was fit to raise his
children when their mother died.'27
The major difference between Califano and Stanley was the
presence or absence of a fundamental right. In Califano, the
receipt of Social Security funds was not determined to be a
fundamental right. 2 8 On the other hand, in Stanley, the right of
fit parents to raise their own children was a fundamental right
with a strong historical tradition.12 9 In Troxel, the right of
parents to the care, custody, and control of their children was at
stake, 130 and the Court stated that a court's determination of
whether to grant grandparent visitation appropriately "occurs on
a case-by-case basis."13 ' Accordingly, in deciding whether to

123

434 U.S. 47 (1977).

124

405 U.S. 645 (1972).

125

434 U.S. at 48. The recipient's wife in this case was also permanently

disabled but was not entitled to these benefits, which were based upon the wageearner of the family rather than the disability of the recipient. Id.
126 Id. at 52-53.
127Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.

128 434 U.S. at 52-54. The Supreme Court has held that procedural due
process
may be required for pre-termination of benefits but has not held that such benefits
are anything but statutorily acquired rights that must be distributed and
terminated fairly; government benefits are certainly not fundamental rights. See
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1970).
129 405 U.S. at 651 ("The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been
deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights of man,' and '[rights far more precious ... than
property rights.'") (alterations in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); May v. Anderson,
345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953)).

130

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).

131

Id. at 73.
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establish individualized pleading standards in grandparent
visitation cases, Stanley, rather than Califano, should be our
guide, and therefore, an individualized determination is
constitutionally necessary under the Equal Protection Clause as
the least restrictive alternative.
Another situation that calls for an individualized
determination is when the statutory classification rests on a
weak assumption that does not constitute a strong proxy for the
underlying rationale of the statute. The Court in Califano found
marriage to be a strong proxy for financial status, stating that
"there can be no question about the validity of the assumption
that a married person is less likely to be dependent on his
parents for support than one who is unmarried," and therefore,
no case-by-case analysis was necessary. 1 32 In contrast, the Court
in Stanley found that no assumptions were permissible. 133 The
Court stated that all unmarried fathers are not neglectful
parents, and, in fact, "some are wholly suited to have custody
of their children."'3 4 Therefore, the Court required a hearing
to make an individualized determination as to whether an
unwed father was fit to be a custodial parent.135 Likewise, in
grandparent visitation cases, it is unwarranted to grant one
fit parent's decision regarding grandparent visitation more
1 36
deference and weight than another fit parent's decision.
Therefore, an individualized determination is necessary to grant
standing for grandparents to petition for visitation with their
grandchildren.
Similarly, in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the
Court held that public school mandatory maternity leave policies
that forced teachers to stop work in the fifth or sixth month of
pregnancy swept "too broadly" and "amount[ed] to a conclusive
presumption" that each pregnant teacher would be physically
incapable of continuing work at the stated time without the
necessary "individualized determination" of the woman's physical
state. 137 The Court found, based on medical testimony, that "the
132

Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977).

133Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654 (stating that some unmarried fathers may be

"unsuitable and neglectful parents" but others may be "wholly suited to have custody
of their children").
134 Id.

131Id.

at 658.

136See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
137414 U.S. 632, 644 (1974).
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ability of any particular pregnant woman to continue at work
past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an individual
matter" and that not all women would be physically unfit to
perform teaching duties during the fifth month of pregnancy. 13
Therefore, the assumption that all pregnant women are not
physically able to teach when five or six months pregnant
was such a weak assumption that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 39
Like the health of a woman at a certain stage in pregnancy
at issue in LaFleur and the suitability of an unwed father in
Stanley, drawing a line based upon non-intact family status is
not accurate or helpful in determining which grandparents
should be able to petition for visitation with their grandchildren.
There is no evidence that children of non-intact families are in
need of grandparent visitation and that children of intact nuclear
families are not. Therefore, an individualized determination,
such as a pleading standard based on the existence of a
grandparent-grandchild relationship, is a less restrictive
alternative. Because such less restrictive alternatives exist,
discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes are not narrowly
tailored and are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION

As grandparent visitation law now stands, more than half of
the states have discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes,
and it is likely that children, parents, and grandparents of all
types of families suffer injustice due to rigid imposition of these
statutes. State courts and the Supreme Court should utilize
strict scrutiny to hold such statutes unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because
parents from all types of families have the same fundamental
138 Id.
at 645-46. The Court further stated that even if some women would
physically need to stop work in the fifth or sixth month, "it is evident that there
are large numbers of teachers who are fully capable of continuing work for
longer ....[Tihe conclusive presumption embodied in these rules ...is
neither 'necessarily (nor) universally true,' and is violative of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 646. Although the Court's opinion focused on the necessity of
individual determinations, the concurring opinion stated, "[iun light of the Court's
language... I would think that a four-week prebirth period would be acceptable."
Id. at 656 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus, it is possible that the Court would have
found a more reasonable mandatory leave date permissible.
13 Id.
at 648 (majority opinion).
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right to direct the upbringing of their children and are, therefore,
similarly situated, it is constitutionally impermissible to classify
some parents under the Scarlet "N" and treat their decisions with
less respect or deference. In addition, state legislatures should
recognize equal protection problems with the discriminatory
statutes and remedy the problem by drafting nondiscriminatory
statutes that incorporate individualized determinations of
whether the child is likely to be in need of visitation with the
grandparents.
Furthermore, discriminatory grandparent visitation statutes
are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Classifying families
based on family status does not constitute an adequate proxy to
determine which children are in need of grandparent visitation
because the classification scheme includes children from nonintact families who do not need a grandparent's presence and
excludes children from traditional nuclear families who may
be in need of a supportive grandparent. Thus, it would be in
the best interests of all children to eliminate statutes that
based grandparental standing on family status in favor of
nondiscriminatory statutes that utilize more individualized
determinations. The suggestion proposed here-that statutes
mandate that the grandparent plead a preexisting significant
grandparent-grandchild relationship-is a viable and wellaccepted statutory approach that would satisfy equal protection
considerations. This less restrictive alternative would impinge
on the parent's fundamental right only when necessary and
would better accomplish what all such statutes are designed to
do-protect children from harm and promote their welfare.
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